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FROM ACCOUNTABILITY TO PUNISHMENT
Michael Junge
 Why does the Navy fire so many commanding officers? Is it, as one Naval War College professor often asserts in lectures, a feature in the system?1 
Is there a problem in the command selection process? Are people just flawed 
individuals? All the above? Or something else? After a decade of research that 
examined almost two thousand individual cases and incidents and hundreds of 
investigations, the answer is clear: the Navy fires commanders who fall short of 
the Navy’s standards. These officers are held to a high standard and are account-
able for their actions. Removal is now nearly synonymous with accountable.
Supporting an argument from largely self-evident cases makes for preconclu-
sive reading. Yet what is falling short? Why does falling short mean removal from 
command? These embedded questions—as well as how standards are defined, 
the temporal nature of standards, what happens after removal, and an assessment 
of the modern removal process and rate compared with historical removals—are 
the central issues of this article. After a very long look at history and analysis of 
the language in dozens of official Navy investigations, an answer to each question 
reveals itself to us. What does the answer to “Why does the Navy remove com-
manding officers?” mean for today’s commanders?
Historically, removal from command followed from a violation directly tied to 
command itself and was described through a term of art—crimes of command—
the most obvious examples of which are collisions, allisions, and groundings. 
Collisions occur when two moving objects strike each other. For example, if, while 
driving home, you strike another moving car on the highway, that is a collision. 
Allisions occur when a moving object strikes a nonmoving object. If, on that same 
drive home, instead of striking a moving car you strike a telephone pole, guard-
rail, or tree, that is an allision. Groundings occur when a ship’s bottom strikes the 
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seafloor. Some groundings are intentional and may not inherently constitute a 
crime of command; the same is true of some collisions and allisions. Sorting out 
the intent is part of the accountability process for these incidents. Major fires, 
weapons accidents, and aviation accidents can fit within the broad definition of 
a crime of command as well.
Why are the examples given above considered crimes of command, whereas 
poor leadership, infidelity, misappropriation of funds, and drunkenness are not? 
If a ship collides, allides, or grounds, the commanding officer is responsible for 
what happened; that responsibility is inherent in command. The commanding 
officer has the power and obligation to train the crew to avoid collisions, alli-
sions, and groundings; to stow 
and secure flammable materi-
als and weapons properly; 
and to adhere to established 
standards. When he or she 
becomes aware of violations of 
rules or regulations, the com-
manding officer also has the 
obligation and power to act. 
Whether the commander was involved directly in an incident is irrelevant; the 
nature of command is inherent in the movements of the ship.
In contrast, infidelity, embezzlement, and drunkenness are individual actions. 
A commander who cheats on a spouse is not involving the command. A com-
mander who uses a government aircraft for personal transportation is acting for 
personal benefit. A drunken commander is just drunk. Likewise, the actions of 
individual sailors do not reflect on or impact the command, necessarily. Each of 
these actions is improper, regardless of whether the individual is in command. 
But if a ship collides, those directly involved in operating the ship and the com-
manding officer are responsible for what happened; they alone are accountable 
for their actions.
History shows that three current trends differ from past patterns. First, today’s 
commanding officers are more likely to be removed for personal failings (moral 
indiscretions, financial mishandlings) or for accidents (fire, grounding, collision) 
that once barely made the news. Second, they are removed via an administrative 
investigation that is far from that outlined in Navy regulations and procedures. 
Finally, this culture of removal arises because of an improper conflation of the 
concepts of accountability, responsibility, and culpability. As the Navy reenters 
an era of great-power competition, it is past the time that we should evaluate our 
culture of command and relearn precise language before we jettison superb com-
manding officers for ahistorical reasons.
[F]lashy events—arrest, grounding, collision, 
death of a sailor—are more likely to result in 
. . . removing a commander than mediocre 
performance, an unpublicized affair, or funds 
mismanagement. However, if those things 
make it into the press, then removal from 
command is far more likely.
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IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
In 2004 and 2010, the Naval Inspector General (IG) sought to answer these same 
questions: Why are we removing so many commanders, and for what reasons? 
Two naval officers, Captain Mark Light and Captain Jason Vogt, published papers 
addressing the subject.2 Neither the papers nor the IG reports provided specific 
answers to any of the questions, and in fact they asserted that even with a hun-
dred removals there were insufficient data to draw any trends or overall linkage.
Both the reports and the papers, however, called attention to the fact that 
removals hovered around 1 percent of commanders, and that this 1 percent 
was historically normal.3 If 1 percent was normal or acceptable, and the reasons 
for removal were accepted and normal when the Navy removed twenty-six of-
ficers in 2003, from a service with 376,000 sailors and 297 ships, then how many 
commanders were removed in 1983, when the Navy had 533 ships and 779,000 
sailors? Or in 1963, when there were 857 ships and almost a million sailors? From 
mere napkin math, the answers should be two times and three times as many 
removals, respectively. But where were the sensational headlines then?
I ultimately identified over 1,500 incidents, including crimes of command 
and personal failures, in the seventy years between 1945 and 2015. Unlike 
the IG reports and the papers by Light and Vogt, the incidents in my study 
displayed a clear trend, a clear change, and evidence that what the Navy does 
today is not what it did in the past. In the decades after World War II, remov-
als occurred, but they were uncommon. Officers who committed missteps in 
command routinely were retained in command, often forgiven, and allowed to 
continue with their careers. If their career paths allowed time for rehabilitation 
or if their prior performance outweighed the misstep, they were promoted and 
remained in the service. While custom and tradition implied that commanders 
would lose command for collisions or groundings, the reality at that time was 
far different.
To evaluate the impact of these incidents, my study identified the incident 
commanding officer and determined whether the commander was removed 
overtly from command, suspiciously departed with a reduced-length tour, was 
relieved by an officer who held command for a few days or weeks, or was relieved 
by someone identified as acting or interim commander. Once the individual 
names were located and combined with evidence—or an educated guess—on 
each removal, I consulted Navy promotion records. Was the officer removed, and 
then failed to promote? Did the officer retain command, but fail to promote? Or, 
as happened in a number of cases, did the officer—whether removed or not—still 
promote after committing a crime of command? 
Graph 1 illustrates trends where, of the 1,500 cases examined, over 330 
commanders were removed overtly from command, and a majority of those 
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removals—305—happened between 1986 and 2015. Another significant differ-
ence lies in the number of officers forgiven or allowed rehabilitation. Between 
1985 and 2015, only sixty-five officers experienced some sort of misstep but were 
promoted afterward, while between 1945 and 1985, over 250 officers recovered—
or about a quarter of the thousand incidents.
RESULTS? ANSWERS? OR MORE QUESTIONS?
So, why are commanding officers removed from command? In general, news and 
Navy reports tell us that commanders are removed because of some mixture of 
alcohol, indiscretion, financial misdeeds, sexual relationships, and other inap-
propriate relationships between senior leaders and junior sailors. Some analysts 
have linked increased removals directly to the presence of women in the Navy.4 
In almost all cases, the official Navy response includes some manner of a “loss of 
confidence in ability to command” and a reference to the “absolute accountability 
of command.”
Graphing the incidents, removals, and recoveries over seventy years (as seen 
in graph 1) reveals the following trends.
1. The Navy is safer today than before—explosions and major fires are rare.
2. Collisions are a constant issue.
3. Groundings are less likely.
4. Individual personal behavior is held to a different standard than in 
previous decades.
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5. Fewer officers recover from missteps.
6. The changes are most apparent before and after the early 1980s, 
specifically before 1983 and after 1986.
The first finding evident in this data set is that in the modern Navy, a com-
mander is most likely to be removed for personal misconduct or when the crime 
of command includes one or all of the following elements: death, press coverage, 
or significant damage to the Navy, whether materially or to its reputation.
An immediate superior in command (ISIC) may remove a commander for 
one or more of four reasons: misconduct, substandard performance involving 
gross negligence, substandard performance over an extended period, or a loss 
of confidence. Each of these is largely subjective and unlikely to be questioned.5 
Whether an ISIC thinks actions constitute misconduct is more important than 
the actions themselves, and in all cases each ISIC has another ISIC above him or 
her, so a commander is subject to the opinions of the captain and each flag officer 
in the chain of command. This is one reason that flashy events—arrest, ground-
ing, collision, death of a sailor—are more likely to result in conversations about 
removing a commander than mediocre performance, an unpublicized affair, or 
funds mismanagement. However, if those things make it into the press, then re-
moval from command is far more likely.
There are no crimes of command that guarantee removal, and there is no 
comprehensive list of reasons for removal. Reportedly, some officers are re-
moved from command to send a message. Perhaps some are removed because 
mixed performance resulted in a strained relationship with the ISIC, and when 
a significant enough event presented itself the ISIC removed a perceived under-
performing commander. In the consideration of the specific reason relating to 
removal, each case should, and must, be treated separately. However, this does 
not preclude recognizing some trends that may allow the Navy to identify future 
issues and reduce command removal rates.
Since 1945, the Navy also has done the following:
1. Reduced the number of senior officers at sea and aboard ships
2. Relied on less-formal fact-finding bodies
3. Conflated operational and personal missteps
4. Focused on rules and consequences rather than intent and capability
To some degree, it is obvious that the Navy is safer today and groundings 
are less likely. We no longer have 1,200-pounds-per-square-inch steam ships, 
we have fewer sailors, we use safer munitions, and we have global positioning 
systems to aid in navigation. Mortality rates for today’s sailor are four times less 
than they were in 1980, and active-duty sailor mortality rates are sixteen times 
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less than the population at large. Graph 2 shows the decline in major fires and 
explosions, especially since the late 1980s. This century has seen seventeen major 
fires afloat, while there were fifteen in 1980 alone. Fifteen fires per year remained 
a rough rolling three-year average into the late 1980s, compared with an average 
of less than one a year since the turn of the century. The result of a safer Navy is 
that each active-duty death is more noticeable. 
Navigation today is far more precise—often more precise even than is useful to 
a ship’s crew. While groundings are rare (see graph 3), collisions remain reduced 
but somewhat constant (see graph 4). The frequency of collisions relates more to 
ships entering and leaving port, operating in congested waters, and conducting 
underway replenishment operations than it does to changes in technology. The 
fact that the Navy is operationally safer supports the decreased removal rate for 
clear crimes of command, but does not explain why fewer officers recover after 
incidents or why personal standards are different now from what they once were. 
The underlying rules and traditions governing command have not changed—
only the standard for removal has.
Through the 1970s, and even into the 1980s, flagships were where the flag 
officer lived and worked. Fleet commanders, and even Chiefs of Naval Opera-
tions, embarked in ships for extended periods—and not only aircraft carriers. 
Today, most sea commands are led by commanders who may never see their 
captain ISIC, much less the flag officer in command of the strike group or fleet. 
This separation among commanders, combined with the more-varied commis-
sioning sources in modern accessions, leads to commanders who no longer have 
personal relationships with most of their subordinate commanders. This removes 
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the possibility of applying a knowing “benefit of the doubt”—the sort that likely 
kept Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey in command even after he endured two 
disastrous typhoons and committed operational missteps at the Battle of Leyte 
Gulf. This personal-professional relationship among commanders was one of the 
reasons for more frequent rehabilitation in the decades after World War II.
Another reason for the modern difference lies in how the Navy investigates 
incidents. Incidents that occurred through the mid-1970s were investigated by 
boards and courts of inquiry. Three or more officers sat together and interviewed 
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witnesses and interested parties before issuing their findings and opinions. Ev-
eryone went on the record. Some of these courts were contentious; many, if not 
most, were routine. Even complicated cases such as the 1952 collision between 
USS Wasp (CV 18) and USS Hobson (DMS 26) took little over a month from 
incident to report completion. The internationally sensitive 1969 collision be-
tween USS Frank E. Evans (DD 754) and HMAS Melbourne (R21) took a little 
over five weeks, with inter-
views and testimony taking 
three weeks and involving 
seventy-nine witnesses. The 
only modern court of in-
quiry was of USS Greeneville 
(SSN 772) regarding its 9 
February 2001 collision with 
Japanese fishing vessel Ehime Maru. The court was appointed eight days after the 
collision but did not convene until 5 March 2001. After twelve days of testimony, 
the court closed on 20 March but did not issue its report until 13 April, sixty-
three days after the collision. The Navy has not held a court or board of inquiry 
for a major incident since, in no small part because the participants believed that 
courts of inquiry, while appropriate to their case, required significant investments 
of resources and time. In other words, they were hard, and there were easier and 
more-efficient ways to accomplish the same result.6
The veracity of this claim is subject to challenge. USS Fitzgerald collided on 
17 June 2017, and the command triad was removed two months later. USS John 
S. McCain collided on 21 August 2017, and the commanding officer and execu-
tive officer were removed on 10 October of the same year. A narrative report was 
released to the press on 1 November, but the actual reports remain withheld and 
the courts-martial for officers in the Fitzgerald incident finally were canceled 
without trial in April 2018.
Other modern cases took similar amounts of time. The investigation into 
the October 2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG 67) was completed forty-eight 
days after the investigation. The investigation into the 1987 attack on USS Stark 
(FFG 31) took twenty-six days. The investigation into the 2005 collision between 
USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) and USS McFaul (DDG 74) took twenty-five 
days. The investigation into the 2013 helicopter mishap aboard USS William P. 
Lawrence (DDG 110) took sixty-one days. The biggest differences between these 
investigations and the courts of inquiry are not time and resources but Navy 
regulations and the rights of the commanders involved.
The older courts of inquiry and the individual officer investigations that have 
dominated the last four decades are governed by the same instruction: The Manual 
[A] commanding officer who sexually harasses 
subordinates, a commander whose ship runs 
aground and is lost to the Navy, or an officer 
who has a minor collision are all treated the 
same way by the Navy. This treatment is in-
consistent with historical practice.
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of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN). This document delineates the require-
ments for preliminary inquiries, command or administrative investigations, and 
courts and boards of inquiry. Command investigations, per the JAGMAN, are 
for ship groundings, shipboard flooding, fires, or collision and aviation mishaps, 
provided they are not identified as major incidents. The JAGMAN defines major 
incidents as follows:
An extraordinary incident occurring during the course of official duties resulting in 
multiple deaths, substantial property loss, or substantial harm to the environment, 
where the circumstances suggest a significant departure from the expected level of 
professionalism, leadership, judgment, communication, state of material readiness, or 
other relevant standard. Substantial property loss or other harm is that which greatly 
exceeds what is normally encountered in the course of day-to-day operations. These 
cases are often accompanied by national public and press interest and significant 
congressional attention. They may also have the potential of undermining public 
confidence in the Naval service. That the case is a major incident may be apparent 
when it is first reported or as additional facts become known.7
This definition has not changed since 1990 and is consistent with prewar 
definitions as found in the 1937 edition of Courts and Boards. Why, then, would 
the Navy use the single-officer investigation over the mandated court of inquiry? 
Courts of inquiry provide for greater legal representation of the commanders and 
other interested parties and the information presented becomes part of an open 
record. In fact, most courts of inquiry were open to spectators and reporters. By 
contrast, today’s investigations are completed, acted on—and subsequently not 
disseminated to the fleet. They become available only to judge advocates on large 
staffs or via the Freedom of Information Act process, which in itself reduces 
the amount of released information, if any is released at all. In many cases, the 
individuals removed from command are not provided copies of the applicable 
investigation, even when they ask for one.
Because commanders are now judged via an administrative process during 
which they enjoy fewer rights than they would in a judicial process, removal for 
personal misconduct is lumped in with operational incidents. Much of the rea-
soning for this process lies in the Navy’s own regulations, wherein any removal is 
treated the same, whether an officer requests relief for some reason or is removed 
by the ISIC for a significant event or personal misconduct. The result is that a 
commanding officer who sexually harasses subordinates, a commander whose 
ship runs aground and is lost to the Navy, and an officer who has a minor colli-
sion are all treated the same way by the Navy.
This treatment is inconsistent with historical practice. John Barry, recognized 
as the “father of the Navy,” ran USS Raleigh aground and abandoned it to the 
British in 1778. William Bainbridge grounded and lost USS Philadelphia in 1803 
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and then was imprisoned in Tripoli for nineteen months. Ensign Chester Nimitz 
ran his first command, USS Decatur, aground. Today all of these officers have 
ships named for them and are revered as heroes of the Navy. And these officers 
are not anomalies, but rather well known. Between 1945 and 2015, over three 
hundred officers recovered from some form of crime of command or personal 
misstep and were promoted or continued on to other commands. In this century, 
across over two hundred crimes of command, only twelve officers recovered, 
with none of those in this decade.
These examples illustrate what was then, and what is now. Other major ques-
tions are how and why. How did the Navy change from a service that allowed re-
covery after an incident to one that never forgives? Where did the idea of a zero- 
defect culture originate? Why does the Navy remove commanders and discard 
them regardless of their prior or potential future contributions? Neither Barry, 
Bainbridge, nor Nimitz—nor even Halsey, Raborn, Mullen, or Natter—would 
survive in today’s Navy. How and why are we here? The answer comes down to 
a single individual who, oddly, held command for roughly six months but was a 
flag officer for almost three decades: Hyman G. Rickover.
WORDS MATTER
For some the groan is audible: “Rickover!?!” Admiral Rickover is both lauded 
and blamed for every facet of the modern Navy. Every success and every failure 
might, in some way, link back to him. At the beginning of this research, Rickover’s 
legacy had no place. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power, yes, but Rickover? No. 
In hindsight, this was an exceptionally naive view. Any study of command must 
at least acknowledge someone who had such a significant impact on the Navy. 
But that is hindsight. It was not until I was reading through the investigations and 
cases that Rickover’s influence started to show through. There are any number of 
stories or tales that can link Rickover to command and removal from command, 
but no instance more directly links to how we got here, and why we got here, than 
Rickover’s statements on responsibility.
In 1961, Rickover testified before Congress as follows:
Responsibility is a unique concept: it can only reside and inhere in a single individual. 
You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, 
but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Even 
if you do not recognize it or admit its presence, you cannot escape it. If responsibility 
is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance, or passing the blame can shift the bur-
den to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible 
when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.8
Certainly, many readers recognize this statement, or something similar to it. It 
appeared in one form or another in a few of the investigations after the mid-1980s 
10
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and has been quoted often since. It is similar to what lies at the core of the next 
issue. What Rickover left behind is not what he said, but how others internalized 
and repeated it.
In 2014, Admiral Dave Oliver, USN (Ret.), wrote in a book about Rickover: 
“Do you agree with Rickover’s concept of accountability? He phrased it thusly: 
‘You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may del-
egate it, but it is still with you. . . . If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, 
or ignorance or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else.’”9
An astute reader will have seen the difference already. Rickover said responsi-
bility; Oliver wrote accountability. While the modern Navy uses the words inter-
changeably, they are two different words and two different concepts, and they are 
misused all too often. These two words also frequently supplant another word: 
culpability. The simple fact is that we no longer differentiate among accountable, 
responsible, and culpable.
Accountability is the condition of someone who is accountable. Being account-
able, or to give account, entails the need to explain one’s actions or to provide a 
balancing of sums. Responsibility is different, even when used synonymously. Re-
sponsibility is the condition of being responsible—that of an obligation or power 
to act or respond. Responsibility carries an additional subtext of claim, credit, 
blame, and sometimes trust. Culpability is the state of being culpable; it often is 
defined as being responsible for a fault or deserving blame. This definition is dif-
ferent from the other two: culpability is associated solely with blame. Culpability 
looks back after an action, as does accountability when one gives account for an 
action. Responsibility is the only word with both a forward-looking (power to 
act) and a backward-looking component (the power to respond). While these 
three terms commonly are used together or in place of each other, their confla-
tion illustrates one of the issues the Navy faces today: imprecision in language 
means not only that we are uncertain about what these words mean today, but we 
misunderstand them when they are used in historical context.
The Navy also does not seem to differentiate between mistake and sin or guilt 
and shame. We all too often think of these different concepts as identical. A mis-
take is not a sin: a mistake is unknowingly doing something wrong, while a sin 
is knowingly doing something wrong. If you know the rule and choose to violate 
it, that is sin. If you should have known the rule and chose not to learn it and 
violated it, that is also sin. If you did not know the rule, you did not know about 
the rule, no one drew your attention to the rule, or you were accustomed to some 
other standard, that is a mistake.
Likewise, guilt and shame are very different concepts. Guilt relates to actions, 
while shame relates to self. The guilty person feels bad that something happened, 
while the ashamed person feels bad about him- or herself. The guilty commander 
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says, “I can’t believe I ran the ship aground.” The ashamed commander says, “I 
can’t believe I ran the ship aground.” This extrapolates up the chain of command 
(and down) with ISICs who are upset that Commander Smith-Jones ran the ship 
aground. How the ISIC frames it—action or person—determines whether the ac-
tion is one that induces guilt or shame; that is, if it is the action being criticized or 
the individual. Guilt is something one can repent from and atone for, but shame 
is not. When we internalize shame, either as an individual or as an institution, we 
say that someone brings shame and discredit on the Navy, and we are saying that 
their actions are unforgivable and irredeemable. This is something we should say 
only in rare cases, and never lightly.
If an officer does not know better or if an officer works within a culture that 
is consistent and constant for the fifteen years prior to command—and is evalu-
ated by an officer who has not 
been to sea in four, seven, or 
ten years, or who never com-
manded a ship at all—then 
those officers are working 
from different frames of refer-
ence. Each officer has a differ-
ent idea of “is,” which leads to a different idea of how things “ought to be.” And 
it is easy to confuse what “is” with what “ought to be” when what “is” generally 
has worked in your favor.10 One of the challenges that leaders face is identifying 
what a subordinate knows, should know, and honestly does not know. Another 
lies in creating the system that imparts the lessons necessary for success in peace 
and war.
One path that helps to guide us through this model of language, rules, under-
standing, and what is or what ought to be is ethics. Professional military ethics 
came into popular understanding with Samuel P. Huntington’s seminal 1957 
work The Soldier and the State. Huntington laid out three criteria for a profes-
sion: special expertise, responsibility toward society, and a sense of corporate-
ness. This sense of corporateness includes a self-policing function whereby the 
profession examines and evaluates members against recognized standards. What 
the Navy has done, however, is to turn from ethics to rules. Ethics are about right 
or wrong, and sometimes about choosing the least wrong of two wrongs. Rules 
are different. Rules are about “shall” or “shall not.” Ethics cannot, and should not, 
be rules. Ethics imply a level of autonomy that requires decision-making, while 
rules do not.
Rickover’s words and legacy provide insight. In 1978, a submarine officer 
who was on his way to his first nuclear submarine for his department head tour 
after initial qualification in diesel submarines wrote that submarine officers were 
How did the Navy change from a service that 
allowed recovery after an incident to one that 
never forgives? . . . Why does the Navy remove 
commanders and discard them regardless of 
their prior or potential future contributions?
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“given responsibility, but not authority, [and] the natural reaction is to ask to be 
told exactly what to do, to request rudder orders. An officer working in a nuclear 
billet can become a commanding officer if he simply makes no major mistakes. 
Leadership is not nearly so important a criterion of success. A leader who does 
what he is told and ensures that he is told everything that he must do does not 
make mistakes.”11
Look at the language: “responsibility, but not authority,” “not make mistakes.” 
Phrases such as these still ring true today and reflect the view of many junior, and 
some senior, officers. If I do not make a mistake, I can make it to command. If I 
take a risk, I might make a mistake. If I follow the rules, I will not be taking a risk. 
This is where the zero-defect culture, the accountability culture, has brought us. 
Do what you are told, nothing more and nothing less, and you will advance. Take 
no risks, make no mistakes, and you will advance. It does not matter that this is 
not what Rickover lived or believed, or that modern leaders do not believe this. 
Enough junior officers do believe it, which is what makes a culture—and culture 
is everything.
For those who wonder and think, “Nineteen seventy-eight—that was forty 
years ago; I was in grade school (or not even born),” look at how the Navy viewed 
ethics in a 2014 white paper written at the Naval War College: The Navy’s “pre-
dominant approach to ethics is legalistic in content and often negative in tone. . . . 
At best, we employ a checklist of what not to do, and at worst, ethical development 
of our people is a chore or a burden that takes away from getting the job done.”12
This is how we moved from broad to narrow, from latitude to checklist. This 
is how we lost focus on the profession and instead emphasized protecting the 
perception and reputation of the Navy. We traded judgment for following orders.
What can we do to right the ship? First of all, we must follow Rickover’s lead. 
Rather than misunderstand him, we must study and learn from his example. 
Imagine if we put as much study into the human psyche, into leadership and 
ethics, as Rickover and the nuclear enterprise put into nuclear power, materials, 
controls, and testing. We must understand and standardize our language so that 
we know the difference between clear concepts such as allision and collision, and 
less clear ones such as accountable, responsible, and culpable. We must know 
where rules matter and where principles are more important. The simple fact is 
that the more rules that exist, the more likely sailors and officers are to violate 
and then ignore them. If rules are no longer applicable, change them. If the eight-
decades-old guidance for courts of inquiry is no longer applicable, change it. But 
do not ignore it out of personal or institutional convenience.
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke had a saying that “a commander who fails to exceed 
his authority is not of much use to his subordinates.” This is not about command-
ers overstepping standards beyond their authority or taking personal liberties 
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with command funds and equipment. Burke was talking about commanders 
exceeding given authority to the betterment and benefit of subordinates: back-
dating awards to advance a well-deserving petty officer who just missed the final 
multiple, or sending fathers home from deployment for a child’s birth.
The Navy also must relearn institutional forgiveness. This is not recom-
mended lightly. The perceived ability to recover from failure is more important 
than any commander’s exhortation that we do not have a zero-defect culture. If 
commanders make a mistake, then they deserve a better education, they deserve 
a chance to show what they have learned, and they deserve to move up. However, 
if they sin—no matter what the results—they must be investigated and evalu-
ated—for the decision, not the outcome. Flouting regulations cannot be absolved 
because everything turned out fine. Likewise, just because something turned out 
badly does not make the decision inherently wrong.
Studies show that forgiveness matters. Many studies, going back centuries, 
have showed us that people lie and people cheat.13 It is part of who we are; it is 
human nature. We also know that those who are absolved of sin, who know that 
repentance is accepted, or who are reminded of the group standard that eschews 
lying or cheating are less likely to sin, or less likely to sin again.14 Some believe 
that if there is no chance of repentance, then they might as well keep doing bad 
things. This is a culture we should avoid at all costs—but we might be headed 
down this road already.
Rickover knew the value of forgiveness. As a junior officer his ship went 
aground and his commanding officer was court-martialed. The court verdict is 
unknown, but this officer, Herbert Kays, was not removed from command and 
went on to be promoted and to command a light cruiser and a destroyer squad-
ron before retiring. In the Navy’s nuclear-propulsion program, legend depicts 
Rickover summarily removing commanders from command for trivial reasons; 
the legend is apocryphal. At least one officer was removed from command of a 
nuclear-powered submarine, twice—but he still was promoted to captain. Er-
nest Barrett commanded USS Permit (SSN 594) until the submarine ran into a 
freighter during precommissioning trials, whereupon he transferred ashore. But 
two years later he reentered the command course, this time for nuclear missile 
submarines. After taking command of USS Ethan Allen (SSBN 608), his boat 
collided with a merchant ship in January 1965, and again he was removed from 
command. But Barrett was promoted to captain before he retired in 1971.15
The Navy removes commanders when they do not meet the standards set for 
them. Despite a constant underpinning of law, regulations, and tradition, Navy 
custom and action have raised those standards and divorced them from historical 
context, such that today’s commanders are held to a higher standard than those 
before them. What began as aspirational now has become the minimum. We 
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should not be surprised if someone does not meet an aspirational standard. This 
also means that more commanders are removed from command, and removed 
from the service, than in past decades. This leads to weakened command, risk-
averse commanders, and a focus that places results ahead of intent. Results are 
important, but ill-intentioned success is more corrosive than the poor results of 
good and well-intentioned commanders. Differentiating the two is the Navy’s 
challenge going forward.
Yet even with this information, some might insist that the responsibility of 
the commanding officer is absolute, and that when blood and treasure are lost 
accountability must be demanded. That argument is valid and correct; however, 
neither accountability nor responsibility mandates removing an officer from 
command. In fact, had the Navy lived by this idea of absolute removal, the follow-
ing officers never would have risen to important positions in our forces:
• Captain Robert J. Kelly, USN, who commanded USS Enterprise (CVN 65) 
when it ran aground in 1983. Kelly served as Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
from 1991 to 1994.
• Commander Mike Boorda, USN, who commanded USS Farragut (DDG 37) 
when it ran aground in 1975. Boorda was Chief of Naval Operations from 
1994 to 1996.
• Captain Leon “Bud” Edney, USN, who commanded USS Constellation  
(CV 64) when it collided with a Bangladeshi merchant ship in 1980. Edney 
also dealt with an explosion aboard USS Ponchatoula (AO 148) when he 
commanded it in 1976. He served as Vice Chief of Naval Operations from 
1988 to 1990.
• Lieutenant Michael Mullen, USN, who in 1973 allided with a buoy when he 
commanded USS Noxubee (AOG 56). Mullen was Chief of Naval Operations 
from 2005 to 2007 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007 to 
2011.
• Captain Roy L. Johnson, USN, who collided with USS Pinnacle (MSO 462) 
while in command of USS Forrestal (CVA 59) in 1956. He commanded U.S. 
Pacific Fleet from 1965 to 1967.
• Captain Joseph S. Mobley, USN, who in 1990 lost twenty-one sailors to a 
liberty boat accident when he commanded USS Saratoga (CV 60). Mobley 
commanded Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet from 1998 to 2001.
• Captain William Raborn, USN, who in 1954 lost 103 sailors when the hydrau-
lic catapult system exploded aboard USS Bennington (CV 20). Raborn retired 
as a vice admiral after overseeing development of the Polaris missile system.
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These are only a few of the more than 150 officers who commanded ships 
during crimes of command yet rose to flag rank before retirement. Those officers 
benefited from a less draconian view of accountability, and the Navy benefited 
from their service and experience. What have we lost in the hundreds of officers 
handled differently over the past three decades?
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